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VOTER ID: COMBATING VOTER FRAUD OR DISENFRANCHISING? A 
COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF VOTER ID LAWS, NATIVE 
AMERICAN DISENFRANCHISEMENT, AND THEIR INTERSECTION 
Will Hyland* 
ABSTRACT 
This note discusses the contentious issue of voter ID laws and 
their ability to disproportionately affect various racial and ethnic 
groups, with specific attention paid to such laws’ effects on Native 
Americans. Since the 2000 election catastrophe and subsequent 
changes to our election system, voter ID laws have become a hot-
button issue. Many states have enacted voter ID laws in the years since, 
some of which have resulted in restrictive voting requirements that 
may result in disproportionately discriminatory voter 
disenfranchisement. This note willa first give a general overview of the 
complicated and convoluted recent development voter ID laws, a 
history of Native American disenfranchisement, and then compare the 
stories of voter ID laws used in the states of North Dakota and 
Washington, two states which both have high populations of 
indigenous citizens living both on reservations and on non-tribal 
lands. While North Dakota’s voter ID law requirements have worked 
in practice to discriminate many Native American citizens living on 
reservations, Washington’s recently amended voter ID law and other 
changes to its election laws have attempted to address these concerns 
efficiently and inexpensively, though more time is needed to see their 
true effect. The note will conclude by arguing that, while courts can 
help to eradicate these laws, a shift in the mindset of policymakers is 
the most effective and efficient way to eliminate targeted 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In 2018, weeks before the midterm elections in North Dakota, 
hundreds of Native American voters from the Spirit Lake Tribe 
discovered that they may have been disenfranchised. In complying 
with recent decision regarding the state’s voter identification law, 
Native Americans who planned to vote had to obtain residential 
addresses to place on their IDs.1 However, without their knowledge, 
 
1 Danielle McLean, New North Dakota ID Restriction Threatens Native 
Americans’ Ability to Vote, THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 2, 2018, 7:26 PM), 
https://archive.thinkprogress.org/exclusive-new-voter-id-restriction-in-north-
dakota-threatens-hundreds-of-natives-ability-to-vote-49937a379793/. 
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local emergency services changed their addresses in the state’s central 
voter database.2 Some absentee ballots were rejected, and 
subsequently, an election advocate discovered that county officials 
were requiring addresses on ID cards to match the addresses in the 
database.3 Native Americans living on reservations often do not have 
residential mailing addresses,4 so there is a heightened danger that the 
addresses they have on their IDs could be changed in the voter 
database by the government, as seen when another tribal member 
discovered that his residential address was assigned to a nearby bar, 
meaning he would be committing fraud if he had voted under that 
address.5 If these massive mistakes had not been discovered, it is likely 
that hundreds of Native American voters would have shown up to the 
polls, only to have their right to vote taken away from them because 
of an action unilaterally taken by the government of which they had 
no knowledge.6 While the actual legitimacy of the North Dakota voter 
ID law will be discussed later on, it is not a good sign that the North 
Dakota government is even capable of disenfranchising those who are 
attempting to following the law’s strict requirements. 
Who has right to vote? It is a question that has been asked over 
and over again since our inception as a country. Our Constitution 
provides some answers, protecting the right to vote in federal elections 
in its original form7 and applying that protection to the states seventy-
nine years later with the adoption of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments.8 Additionally, the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), first 
enacted in 1965 and currently reauthorized through 2032, the seminal 
piece of federal legislation protecting against voter 




4 Patty Ferguson-Bohnee, How the Native American Vote Continues to Be 




6 McLean, supra note 1. 
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
8 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
286 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 29 
voting laws.9 However, even with all of these protections, states and 
political subdivisions have continued to find new ways to 
disenfranchise their populations, often couching that rationale beneath 
a neutral, nondiscriminatory reason for enacting certain laws. 
Voter ID laws, laws requiring prospective voters to show an 
acceptable form of identification prior to registering or voting, have 
been one example of this recent trend, and they have been a 
contentious issue since their popularization began shortly after the 
2000 election. While there may be some legitimate reasons for these 
laws to exist, and while some states adhere mostly to those legitimate 
reasons in passing and enforcing their voter ID laws, other states have 
taken advantage of such laws and have used them as pretexts for 
discriminatory disenfranchisement. One particularly appalling 
example of this trend is the state of North Dakota, which passed a voter 
ID law that is still in effect today10 and had a clear discriminatory effect 
on Native Americans living on reservations until a consent decree 
entered into last year ameliorated most of those effects. In comparison, 
the state of Washington, in response to the controversy surrounding 
North Dakota’s voter ID law, amended its own voter ID law as part of 
a recently enacted Native American Voting Rights Act.11 The law is 
able to maintain an acceptable rationale behind having voter ID laws 
in the first place while directly seeking to expunge any discriminatory 
effects on Native Americans living in the state. States with a large 
Native American population should follow Washington’s approach 
and ensure protection of the right to vote without placing a serious 
burden on otherwise eligible Native American voters. State 
legislatures should also follow Washington’s approach of actively 
protecting the civil rights of its citizens instead of prioritizing their 
own political power. 
Part II of this paper will discuss the recent history that led to 
the recent explosion of voter ID laws and will define the four different 
broad categories of voter ID laws that have been employed by different 
states. Part III will summarize the historical practice of Native 
American disenfranchisement and emphasize why it is so important 
 
9 52 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10702. 
10 See N.D. Cent. Code §§ 16.1-01-04.1, 16.1-05-07. 
11 See Native American Voting Rights Act, S.B. 5079, 66th Leg., (Wash. 2019). 
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to make sure that Native Americans will be truly enfranchised in every 
election in which they desire to exercise their right to vote, a 
fundamental right. Part IV will discuss North Dakota’s voter ID law 
saga and where it stands today, while also briefly mentioning 
Washington’s recent voter ID law change and how it should be a 
harbinger of a major shift towards greater protection against Native 
American disenfranchisement on a statewide level. Part V will 
emphasize the importance of these issues and propose a solution as to 
how these discriminatory voter ID laws can be eliminated in an 
efficient manner. 
I. HISTORY AND GENERAL OVERVIEW OF VOTER ID LAWS 
The state of elections in the United States changed dramatically 
after the 2000 presidential election. The events that occurred in the 
state of Florida live in infamy, and in response to that widely 
recognized debacle, election law was slowly overhauled on both the 
federal and state levels. While both sides of the political spectrum 
acknowledged that there was a problem that needed to be addressed, 
they did not agree about what the problem was. The Florida Election 
Report, an investigation and conducted by the United States 
Commission on Civil Rights, served both as a microcosm of the 
ideological split between parties and as an informative look at what 
problem would ultimately be addressed by the Department of Justice 
in the future.12 
A. The Florida Election Report and “Voter Fraud” 
The events that transpired in Florida leading up to, during, and 
after election day in 2000 shocked the country. While many most 
strongly remember the recount issue that eventually ended up in the 
Supreme Court,13 Florida was plagued with a number of other serious 
problems as well, including accusations of widespread and 
disproportionate voter disenfranchisement due to a number of 
 
12 U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING 
2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/
report/main.htm. 
13 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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actions.14 A thorough investigation was needed to discern how and 
why the election disaster happened, and the answers would 
eventually be found in the Florida Election Report, conducted by the 
United States Commission of Civil Rights. The Commission, 
composed at the time of eight appointed members (four Democrat, 
three independent, one Republican),15 investigated the veracity of 
numerous practices and policies that allegedly contributed to voter 
disenfranchisement and who was responsible for the decisions that 
eventually brought about these claims.16 It held a number of public 
hearings and heard from hundreds of witnesses across the spectrum, 
including the governor of Florida, state officials, experts on election 
law and reform, and Florida citizens and registered voters.17 
After many months of investigation, the Commission 
concluded that Florida had indeed violated the Voting Rights Act. In 
so finding, the Commission uncovered a number of actions leading up 
to and during election day that resulted in the disenfranchisement of 
African American and minority voters, with African American voters 
having had a ten times greater chance of having their ballots rejected 
as compared to white voters.18 The Commission attributed this 
discrepancy in ballot rejection frequency was attributed to a number 
of factors.19 One of these factors was the use of antiquated voting 
systems in counties with large minority populations, which resulted in 
more votes being spoiled in these counties as compared to wealthier 
counties with a greater percentage of white voters.20 Another factor 
was the use of purge lists. Used to remove ineligible voters from 
registration rolls, including all convicted felons (who at this time were 
 
14 See Ari Berman, How the 2000 Election in Florida Led to a New Wave of Voter 
Disenfranchisement, THE NATION (Jul. 28, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/art
icle/archive/how-the-2000-election-in-florida-led-to-a-new-wave-of-voter-disenf
ranchisement/. 
15 Florida Election Bias ‘Exposed in Report’, THE GUARDIAN (June 5, 2001), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/jun/05/uselections2000.usa. 
16 U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 12, at introduction, https://www.
usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/report/intro.htm. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at Ch. 9. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
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not allowed to vote in Florida for the rest of their lives unless the 
governor granted them clemency),21 deceased, duplicate, and mentally 
incompetent voters, these lists were poorly maintained by election 
officials in the leadup to the 2000 election.22 The Commission 
emphasized this point by discussing Miami-Dade County, where 
about one out of every seven names on the county’s purge list was 
erroneous, and while some of these voters were able to appeal and 
remain on the rolls, other voters either did not know they were on the 
list or were not successful in their appeals.23 Additionally, the 
Committee found that the purge lists had a disparate impact on 
Florida’s African American population, as they were more likely to be 
found on the purge lists than persons of other races, increasing the 
likelihood of discriminatory disenfranchisement.24 The Committee 
concluded that these factual findings showed a violation of section 2 
of the Voting Rights Act and that litigation should be pursued against 
those responsible, including state and local election officials, the 
secretary of state, and governor Jeb Bush to ensure compliance with 
the VRA in future Florida elections.25 
While the majority of the Civil Rights Commission signed onto 
the report, two dissenters had a markedly different view of the 
situation. Commissioners Abigail Thernstrom and Russell G. 
Redenbaugh, both noted for holding more conservative viewpoints at 
this time,26 attacked the conclusions drawn by the majority of the 
Committee in the Report. They argued that the Committee of relying 
on a flawed statistical analysis for its claim of disenfranchisement and 
accused the Committee of allowing partisan interests to jeopardize the 
 
21 See FLA. CONST. of 1968 art. VI, § 4(a); see FLA. STAT.  § 940.01(1) (2021); see 
Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Florida, BRENNAN CENTER (Sept. 11, 2020), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-rights-restorati
on-efforts-florida. 
22 U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 12, at Ch. 1. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at Ch. 9. 
26 See Charlie Savage, Maneuver Gave Bush a Conservative Rights Panel, 
BOSTON GLOBE (Nov. 6, 2007), http://archive.boston.com/news/nation/articles/
2007/11/06/maneuver_gave_bush_a_conservative_rights_panel/?page=full. 
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public’s belief in a bedrock concept of American democracy.27 In 
addition to questioning the Committee for what they did investigate 
and conclude, the dissenters criticized the majority for what they failed 
to investigate.28 With specific reference to the aforementioned purge 
lists, the dissenters stated that there was no proof of eligible voters 
being denied the right to vote and that, in reality, the greater issue that 
required investigation was the reports of ineligible felons (and other 
ineligible voters) having their votes counted because they were not on 
the lists.29 Thernstrom and Redenbaugh disagreed with the majority’s 
conclusion that this “voter fraud” issue was “beyond the scope” of the 
investigation and not a major factor in the election, stating that it was 
“unconscionable” that the Commission made no effort to investigate 
these “widely-publicized allegations of fraud.”30 Given that the 
dissent’s report was more aligned with the Executive’s viewpoints at 
this time31 and much less critical of the President’s brother,32 it is 
unsurprising that the new administration’s focus in addressing the 
concerns raised by the 2000 election followed that report’s lead (calling 
for investigation into “voter fraud”) instead of the majority report 
(calling for investigations into voter disenfranchisement).33 
The “voter fraud” terminology has been used long before this 
report, however. In its simplest form, voter fraud is “when individuals 
 
27 ABIGAIL THERNSTROM & RUSSELL G. REDENBAUGH, THE FLORIDA ELECTION 
REPORT: DISSENTING STATEMENT 1 (July 19, 2001), https://media4.manhattan-
institute.org/pdf/final_dissent.pdf. 
28 Id. at 8. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 49. 
31 See, e.g., id. at 9, 28, 49, 51. 
32 Compare U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 12, at Ch. 9, 
https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/report/ch3.htm (“The U.S. Department of 
Justice should initiate the litigation process against the governor regarding his 
failure to appoint special officers to investigate alleged election law violations that 
discriminated against people of color. Appropriate enforcement action should be 
initiated to ensure compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965.”) with 
THERNSTROM AND REDENBAUGH, supra note 27, at 2, 5, 7–8, 43 (arguing that the 
Committee had a vendetta against the governor, blamed him for occurrences he 
was not responsible for, and treated him unfairly when he was called in as a 
witness). 
33 Berman, supra note 14. 
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cast ballots despite knowing that they are ineligible to vote,”34 i.e., 
voter impersonation. However, the term has been morphed over the 
years to be the “go-to” reason for any form of election irregularity that 
takes place.35 This mislabeling, often borne out of a politically strategic 
fear-mongering mentality, distracts attention from real issues and 
excuses the policy of passing unnecessary and discriminatory 
legislation that both suppress otherwise legitimate voters and serve no 
actual purpose.36 And while actual in-person voter fraud has occurred 
in the past, the Brennan Center’s thorough report studying numerous 
found incident rates between .0003 percent and .0025 percent, meaning 
there is a higher chance of a person being struck by lightning than a 
person committing in-person voter fraud.37 The Thernstrom dissent 
foreshadowed what was coming in the next decade: the voter ID law 
revolution. And as discussed in Part IV infra, the “voter fraud” 
justification in this area can have dire consequences for otherwise 
eligible voters. 
B. HAVA, Voter ID Popularization, & Nuts and Bolts of 
Voter ID Laws 
Before the 2000 election, fourteen states had already enacted 
some form of voter ID law.38 South Carolina was the earliest to the 
party, enacting the first voter ID law in 1950, while the second state to 
do so, Hawaii, did so twenty years later.39 These early state laws were 
adopted with little uproar, and at this point, there was no clear 
 




36 Id. at 4, 6. 
37 Debunking the Voter Fraud Myth, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 1, 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Briefing_Memo_Deb
unking_Voter_Fraud_Myth.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2021). [hereinafter Voter 
Fraud Myth]. This document contains scores of more studies illustrating the rarity 
of voter fraud. 
38 Voter ID History, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 31, 
2017), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id-history.a
spx [hereinafter NCSL ID History]. 
39 Id. 
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evidence of political ideology impacting their adoptions.40 
Importantly, in all of these fourteen states, if voters failed to abide by 
the identification requirement, provisions remained in place so that 
they could still cast a regular ballot on election day.41 
In 1993, Congress passed the National Voter Registration Act42 
(“NVRA”), also commonly known as the “Motor Voter Act,”43 which 
sought to simplify the registration process and make voting easier for 
Americans.44 In expanding voter registration and abridging the ways 
in which states could remove voters from their registration lists,45 the 
NVRA caused strife among some state legislatures, who complained 
that it would be now more difficult than ever to prevent “voter 
fraud.”46 The fervor of these fraud concerns was catalyzed by the 
razor-thin Florida results in 2000 and the controversy surrounding the 
purge lists, though it is plausible that lackadaisical maintenance of 
voter registration rolls was an equal if not greater causal factor.47 
Nonetheless, the passage of the Help America Vote Act48 
(“HAVA”) in 2002 was an important step in addressing concerns over 
the electoral system stemming from 2000. Much of the Act was focused 




42 National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 
(originally codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg–1973gg-10, currently codified at 52 
U.S.C. §§ 20501–20511). 
43 See id. at § 20504 (allows citizens to register to vote and apply for a driver’s 
license simultaneously). 
44 See About the National Voter Registration Act, THE UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (May 21, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/crt/about-
national-voter-registration-act. 
45 See id. at § 20507. 
46 Eugene D. Mazo, Finding Common Ground on Voter ID Laws, 49 U. MEM. L. 
REV. 1233, 1237 (2019) (citing LARRY J. SABATO & GLENN R. SIMPSON, DIRTY 
LITTLE SECRETS: THE PERSISTENCE OF CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 321–
22 (1996)). 
47 See U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 12, at Ch. 1. 
48 Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (originally 
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545, currently codified at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901–
21145). 
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oversight in the organization and administration of federal elections.49 
The Act also addressed the registration problem, requiring states to 
create computerized voter registration lists and procedures for 
accurately maintaining them, which includes verifying voter 
information contained in a registration application through an 
applicant’s driver’s license, social security number, or, if the applicant 
has neither, an assigned voter identification number.50 And most 
pertinently, HAVA imposed certain, limited identification 
requirements for states to impose.51 First, if a voter’s name does not 
appear on the registration lists or their eligibility is otherwise 
challenged at the polls, HAVA mandates that the voter has a right to 
cast a provisional ballot,52 a ballot which can be set aside on election 
day and either counted or discarded after an investigation into the 
voter’s uncertain eligibility.53 Additionally, first-time voters in a State 
who registered for a federal election by mail were now required to 
present valid photo identification before casting their ballot, whether 
they decided to vote in-person or by mail.54 If photo ID is unavailable, 
HAVA does allow for other enumerated forms of identification to 
suffice.55 These requirements are the bare minimum, and the Act 
makes sure to note that states are free to impose more stringent voter 
ID laws if they so desire.56 
To satisfy the requirements of HAVA, many states were forced 
to pass new legislation. With regard to the voter ID requirement, forty-
four states were not in compliance at the time the Act became law in 
late 2002, and legislative action on this issue thus became mandatory 
 
49 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901–21072. 
50 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a). 
51 52 U.S.C. § 21083(b). 
52 52 U.S.C. § 21802. 
53 Provisional Ballots, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 
17, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/provisional-
ballots.aspx [hereinafter NCSL Provisional]. 
54 52 U.S.C. § 21083(b)(1-2). 
55 52 U.S.C. § 21083(b)(2)(A)(i-ii)(II) (requiring “a copy of a current utility bill, 
bank statement, government check, paycheck, or other government document that 
shows the name and address of the voter” if the voter lacks valid photo 
identification). 
56 52 U.S.C. § 21084. 
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and imminent.57 Even though HAVA’s identification requirements 
were only for federal elections, states often decided to apply its 
requirements to their own state elections as well, as the systems for 
running each kind of election are so intertwined that, for overall 
convenience, a change to one will most often lead to a change in the 
other.58 States also took notice of the express HAVA provision 
allowing them to enact stricter requirements, and this provision gave 
legislators who may already have been interested in enacting voter ID 
provisions an opening to put their ideas into action.59 By 2007, thirty-
four states had passed voter ID legislation with stricter requirements 
than HAVA’s minimum standards.60 
Presently, thirty-five states have voter ID laws that are 
operational.61 While they all are generally aimed at attacking the same 
issues of election integrity, there is variability among states as to the 
type of requirements they see as achieving that goal in the present 
landscape. While some of the schemes may overlap, the National 
Conference of State Legislatures (“NCSL”) has grouped state voter ID 
laws generally into four categories: strict photo ID, non-strict photo ID, 
strict non-photo ID, and non-strict non-photo ID.62 Each of these 
categories has different impacts on voter participation, as the more 
restrictive laws tend to disenfranchise more voters due to their 
restrictive requirements, while the less restrictive laws tend to make it 
easier for a voter to have their vote counted even if they do not show 
the required identification.63 
Among these four different categories, there are two 
significant differences. First, there is the more easily discernible 
 
57 Mazo, supra note 46, at 1239. 
58 Samuel P. Langholz, Fashinoning a Constitutional Voter Identification 
Requirement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 731, 747 n. 84 (citing Robert S. Montjoy, HAVA 
and the States, in ELECTION REFORM: POLITICS AND POLICY 16, 33 n. 1 (Daniel 
J. Palazzolo & James W. Ceaser eds., 2005)). 
59 Mazo, supra note 46, at 1239–40. 
60 Id. at 1240. 
61 Voter Identification Requirements, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/voter-id.aspx [hereinafter NCSL Voter ID]. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
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distinction between states who require photo identification and states 
who do not. For this requirement, the thirty-five states are split nearly 
evenly, as eighteen require some form of photo identification while 
seventeen do not, accepting other documents, such as bank statements, 
birth certificates, utility bills or passports which verify a voter’s 
identity.64 Some states may find numerous forms of identification 
acceptable,65 while others may limit acceptable forms to a small 
number of documents.66 
The second, more complex distinction is between strict and 
non-strict laws. Strict voter ID laws make it more difficult for a voter 
to have their vote counted when they show up to the polls without the 
proper identification.67 For example, a state may require a voter to fill 
out a provisional ballot and then require the voter to take extra steps 
to guarantee that ballot is counted, such as going back to the election 
office within a certain time period after the election with the proper 
identification.68 Conversely, non-strict voter ID laws allow for more 
flexibility if the voter lacks the proper identification at the polls.69 For 
example, a state may allow the vote to count without additional action 
required from the voter, such as by requiring the voter to sign an 
affidavit at the polls affirming that he or she is the person who is listed 
on the election record,70 allowing election officials to waive the ID 
requirement if they know the voter’s identity,71 or allowing the voter 
to submit a provisional ballot and having election officials, after 
closing of the polls, unilaterally determine whether the voter was 
otherwise eligible and registered to vote. This latter option can be 
achieved through different verification methods. Most states use a 
signature match with records from the voter’s registration record,72 
 
64 Id. 
65 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 101.043(1)(a) (2021). 
66 See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-18-6.1 (2021). 
67 NCSL Voter ID, supra note 61. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15 § 4937(a) (2021). 
71 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 15.15.225(b) (2021). 
72 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 101.043(1)(b) (2021); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-
15-107(2) (2021). 
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through some states require additional information to be matched 
with the registration database.73 
C. Constitutional Challenges to Voter ID Laws 
There has been a plethora of legal challenges to voter ID laws 
in the last twenty years, at both the federal and state levels. Challenges 
to these laws are usually brought either on constitutional grounds or 
under the VRA. The most notable challenge, and the only voter ID case 
to ever reach the Supreme Court,74 has been to Indiana’s voter ID law, 
which was passed in 2005 and is still one of the most restrictive in the 
nation. Named Senate Election Law 483 (“SEA 483”), this strict photo 
ID law requires in-person voters to present a photo ID before voting 
on election day.75 While Indiana does not provide an enumerated list 
of acceptable forms of identification, it does provide a list of four 
requirements for the identification document to be accepted at the 
polls.76 If voters are unable to meet the identification requirement on 
election day, they may vote on a provisional ballot.77 For this 
provisional ballot to be counted, the voter must appear before the 
circuit court clerk or county election board within ten days of the 
election.78 While there, the voter must produce the proper 
identification or execute an affidavit stating that they are not able to 
obtain the proper identification due to indigence or a religious 
objection to being photographed.79 If the voter was asked to vote 
provisionally for an additional reason, the validity of that reason will 
 
73 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 26 § 7-114(B)(2) (2021) (requiring the affidavit signed 
when casting the provisional ballot to contain a matching name, residence address, 
date of birth, and driver’s license or SSN number to the voter registration database 
for the provisional ballot to be counted). 
74 Mazo, supra note 46, at 1247. 
75 See IND. CODE §§ 3-5-2-40.5, 3-10-1-7.2, 3-11-8-25.1 (2021). 
76 Id. § 3-5-2-40.5 (The ID must contain: (1) the name of the individual, which 
must conform to the name in the voter’s registration record; (2) a photograph of 
the voter; (3) an expiration date, which must not be expired or, if expired, must 
have expired after the most recent general election; and (4) must have been issued 
by the state of Indiana or the United States). 
77 Id. § 3-10-1-7.2(d). 
78 Id. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(a). 
79 Id. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(b-c). 
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have to also be determined and resolved before the ballot can be 
counted.80 
Almost immediately after this law was enacted, the Indiana 
Democratic Party and the Marion County Democratic Central 
Committee filed suit in federal court, arguing that the law was facially 
unconstitutional, substantially burdening the right to vote in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.81 Crawford v. 
Marion County Election Board reached the Supreme Court, and in a 
fractured plurality opinion authored by Justice Stevens, who was 
joined only by Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts,82 the Court 
affirmed the lower court rulings and upheld the law.83 The Court 
began by summarizing the legal precedent to determine the standard 
of review.84 It concluded that, to determine this law’s constitutionality, 
a balancing test must be employed which weighs the burden the law 
places on voters, however slight, against “relevant and legitimate state 
interests sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation.”85 This standard, 
weighing the “asserted injury to the right to vote against the precise 
interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden 
imposed by its rule,”86 is known as the Anderson/Burdick balancing 
standard. It is unique to voting regulations, which are not subject to 
strict scrutiny if they are deemed to not impose a “severe” burden on 
the right to vote.87 
The Court first held that Indiana had several legitimate 
interests behind the statute, including protecting election integrity 
through the maintenance of accurate voter registration lists in 
compliance with NVRA and HAVA, combating voter fraud, and 
 
80 Id. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(e). 
81 Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 186–87 (2008). 
82 A separate concurrence, only in the judgment itself, was authored by Justice 
Scalia, who was joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Alito. Thus, the law was 
upheld 6-3, but the rationale for upholding it was split down the middle. Stevens’ 
opinion is the controlling opinion, however. 
83 Id. at 188–89. 
84 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 190–91. 
85 Id. at 191 (quoting Norman v. Reed., 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1992)). 
86 Id. at 190 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)). 
87 See generally Mazo, supra note 46, at 1250 n.97 (describing the development 
of the Anderson/Burdick standard of review); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 
(1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
298 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 29 
protecting public confidence in the integrity of the democratic 
process.88 Concerning voter fraud in particular, the Court held that, 
although the record contained no evidence of any in-person fraud 
occurring in Indiana in the entire history of the state, historical 
instances of such fraud in other areas of the country and the need for 
accurate recordkeeping and orderly administration of elections are 
enough to overcome the wanting evidence of actual fraud.89 Turning 
to the other side of the scale, the Court held that the petitioners failed 
to present enough evidence of the voter ID law excessively burdening 
any class of voters to a degree great enough to outweigh Indiana’s 
legitimate interests, and thus, the facial challenge to the statute was 
insufficient.90 The Court explained that the record lacked concrete 
evidence of difficulties faced by elderly, indigent, or religious voters 
as a result of the statute, and it held that the small number of examples 
provided by the petitioners were only enough to show a “limited 
burden on voters’ rights.”91 To some, the plurality’s analysis did 
seemingly leave the door open for future “as-applied” constitutional 
challenges (where a law is challenged for how it is applied by the state, 
not on its face) if the plaintiffs could show the illegitimate application 
of the law on the record.92 
In dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, attacked 
the plurality’s improper use of the Burdick standard, noting that a State 
must do more than invoke abstract interests; it also must “make a 
particular factual showing that the threats to its interests outweigh the 
particular impediments it has imposed.”93 In first analyzing the 
impediments, Souter and Ginsburg find there to be a considerable 
 
88 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191–97. 
89 Id. at 194–97. 
90 Id. at 202–03. 
91 Id. at 203. 
92 See L. Paige Whitaker, Legal and Constitutional Issues Regarding Photo ID 
Laws, in State Voter Identification Requirements: Analysis, Legal Issues, and 
Policy Considerations 12 (2016), https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metad
c944762/m2/1/high_res_d/R42806_2016Oct21.pdf. 
93 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 209 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also wrote a 
separate opinion in dissent. 
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number, including the burden of travel costs in obtaining the ID,94 the 
inadequate provisional ballot exception,95 and the District Court’s 
finding that approximately 43,000 Indiana residents lack the proper 
identification and thus will bear these burdens, with a large proportion 
of that group likely struggling economically.96 The dissent stated that 
the impediments resulting from the voter ID law would likely 
discourage a significant group of poor and disabled people from 
voting, and therefore, a much more thorough examination of the 
State’s interests was required (as compared to the examination 
conducted by the plurality).97 
The dissent discredited all of Indiana’s asserted interests. 
Dealing first with voter fraud, Souter and Ginsburg described the 
fictitiousness of this interest and its relation to the Indiana voter ID 
law. They did so by first showing that this law only combats in-person 
voter fraud, which there is no evidence of in Indiana’s history and very 
little evidence nationwide.98 While the State argued this dearth of 
evidence was due to impersonation fraud being hard to detect, Souter 
and Ginsburg provided the much more rational explanation: that it 
would likely be the easiest type of fraud to detect because the fraud 
would be occurring out in the open.99 Additionally, the incentives for 
doing it are almost non-existent, as it was a felony offense in Indiana, 
and a single fraudulent vote would never change an election in any 
meaningful way; moreover, while an organized group of fraudulent 
 
94 Id. at 211–216 (explaining that voters need to travel to the Bureau of Motor 
Vehicles (“BMV”) to obtain the ID, a trip which is complicated due to a small 
number of BMVs per precinct, limited public transportation, and the requirement 
to pay at least one fee for corresponding documents needed for the ID to be 
issued). 
95 Id. at 216–18 (explaining the ten-day requirement, demonstrating that an 
indigent person or religious objector will have to go through the process every 
time they want to vote, and showing empirical data from a prior municipal election 
where only ~5% of provisional voters were able to follow the steps to have their 
votes counted). 
96 Id. at 218–21. 
97 Id. at 222–23. 
98 Id. at 226–27. 
99 Id. at 227. 
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voters could have a slightly greater impact, such a plan would be much 
more difficult to conceal.100 
Souter and Ginsburg quickly dismissed Indiana’s remaining 
asserted interests. First, they described the interest in fixing bloated 
voter rolls as nothing more than Indiana attempting to benefit from 
negligent maintenance of its own registration lists.101 The dissenters 
found this to weaken the State’s fraud argument even more, as Indiana 
is seemingly more interested in correcting a potential symptom of the 
bloated lists (impersonation) by restricting the right to vote, when in 
reality, it could achieve the same result by competently managing the 
lists.102 Finally, Indiana’s interest in safeguarding voter confidence also 
failed scrutiny, as the State showed nothing to suggest that its voters 
doubted the integrity of their electoral process.103 On this record, 
Souter and Ginsburg concluded that the serious burdens placed on 
certain groups as a result of this voter ID law greatly outweigh the 
State’s asserted interests behind its enactment.104 
Crawford has continued to be a controversial decision to this 
day, namely because it has allowed states to use the abstract interest 
of “preventing voter fraud” to pass strict voter ID laws and thus has 
made it challenging to facially attack the constitutionality of these 
laws.105 Justice Stevens has come to regret writing this decision, stating 
in 2014 that while he believes it was the “correct” outcome given the 
poor record established by the plaintiffs in the case, he also believes 
that, in general, voter ID laws are unnecessary and “not a good 
idea.”106 The famous Judge Richard Posner, who wrote the 2-1 majority 
decision at the appellate level, went even further, stating in 2013 that 
at the time of the decision, he did not realize these identification laws 
would be used to disenfranchise otherwise-qualified voters and 
referred to Indiana’s voter ID law as “a type of law now widely 
 
100 Id. at 227–29. 
101 Id. at 234. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 235. 
104 Id. at 236. 
105 Mazo, supra note 46, at 1252; Berman, supra note 14. 
106 Mazo, supra note 46, at 1251 (quoting FORA.tv, John Paul Stevens Regrets 
Marijuana & Voter IDs Rulings, YOUTUBE (May 2, 2014), https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=fPfApKU7KbY (at 1:52-minute mark)). 
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regarded as a means of voter suppression rather than of fraud 
prevention.”107 The difficulties created by Crawford have led some 
attorneys to seek new legal strategies to attack restrictive voter ID 
laws, the most notable of which has been challenges brought under 
Section 2 of the VRA. 
D. Section 2 Challenges to Voter ID Laws 
The original section 2 was very similar to the Fifteenth 
Amendment108 but with the ability of better enforcement of those 
principles. In the 1982 reauthorization of the VRA, in response to a 
restrictive Supreme Court decision interpreting section 2,109 Congress 
amended it to also proscribe laws that are “facially neutral” but have 
discriminatory effects on protected groups.110 The barring of laws with 
a discriminatory effect, also known as a “disparate impact,” was an 
exercise of Congress’ power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment 
through legislation.111 Historically, many of the cases arising under 
section 2 and using the “effects” framework tend to be challenges to 
“vote dilution” practices, which involve at-large schemes such as 
redistricting, that work to lessen the impact of a protected group’s 
vote.112 But the section’s reach has also reached “vote denial” practices, 
or those practices that work to disenfranchise certain groups 
altogether.113 This latter category contains many historically attacked 
practices, such as poll taxes, literacy tests, and language or color-
 
107 Mazo, supra note 46, at 1251 (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS OF 
JUDGING 84–85 (2013)). 
108 Voting Rights Act, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (1965). 
109 See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61 (1980) (The Court held that a 
“discriminatory purpose” on the part of lawmakers was required to establish a 
violation under section 2). 
110 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (“no voting qualification or prerequisite for voting, or 
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied . . . in a manner which 
results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to 
vote on account of race or color . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
111 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. 
112 Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 11, 2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/section-2-voting-rights-act. 
113 Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the 
Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 691 (2006). 
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specific requirements for voting, though all of these specific practices 
were barred from use when effects claims became pursuable in 1982.114 
Voter ID laws have been a relatively new addition to this “vote denial” 
category, and while on the whole, they are not as blatantly 
discriminatory as those Jim Crow era voting laws, they can be used to 
achieve results similar to those despicable historical practices. Because 
the use of section 2 to attack voter ID laws specifically is in its legal 
infancy, the case law in this area is somewhat divergent and sparse, 
especially on the discriminatory effects front.115 However, some courts 
have found section 2 violations stemming from voter ID laws in recent 
years.116 
One such case challenged Texas’ voter identification law, 
known as Senate Bill 14 (“SB 14”), and the Fifth Circuit thoroughly 
outlined the modern section 2 approach to vote denial challenges. The 
Texas law was similarly restrictive to Indiana’s and fell into the strict 
photo ID category, becoming effective in 2013 and being challenged on 
multiple grounds, including both discriminatory purpose and 
discriminatory effect section 2 claims.117 After an arduous litigation 
process which spawned one appellate opinion,118 the Fifth Circuit 
reheard the case en banc a year later.119 While the Court remanded on 
the discriminatory intent claim for a reweighing of the evidence,120 it 
affirmed the district court’s finding on the discriminatory effect claim, 
holding that such an effect was present and remanded for a 
determination of the appropriate remedy.121 
 
114 Id. 
115 See Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas S. Spencer, Administering Section 2 




116 See, e.g., N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th 
Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017). 
117 See Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487, 496 (5th Cir. 2015) (the first appellate 
opinion). 
118 Id. at 487. 
119 Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016). 
120 Id. at 230. 
121 Id. at 264–65. 
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In conducting the discriminatory purpose analysis, the Fifth 
Circuit applied the well-known intent test articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp122 and commonly used in traditional Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendment analyses to determine whether direct or 
circumstantial evidence support a finding that “a particular decision 
was made with any discriminatory purpose, whether it was the 
primary purpose or not.”123 The test consists of five, non-exhaustive 
factors: “(1) the historical background of the decision, (2) the specific 
sequence of events leading up to the decision, (3) departures from the 
normal procedural sequence, (4) substantive departures, and (5) 
legislative history, especially where there are contemporary 
statements by members of the decision-making body.”124 Challengers 
making this claim bear the original burden of showing that “racial 
discrimination was a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor behind the 
enactment of the law.”125 If this burden is met, the burden of proof is 
shifted to the defenders of the law, who must show that the law would 
have been enacted anyway, even without the discrimination factor.126 
While the discriminatory intent/purpose framework for 
section 2 claims uses the same analytical framework as well-
established constitutional claims, there is no such consensus for the 
“discriminatory effect”/”disparate impact” framework.127 The 1982 
amendment to section 2 was in the midst of a period where section 2 
was used mainly for vote dilution claims.128 So, there has been much 
debate and uncertainty as to what type of analysis to use for vote 
denial claims, the category under which challenges to voter ID laws 
would fall.129 
 
122 See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 
(1977). 
123 Veasey, 830 F.3d at 230. 
124 Id. at 231 (citing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267–68). 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 See id. at 243. 
128 See Tokaji, supra note 113, at 691. 
129 See, e.g., Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 554 (6th 
Cir. 2014) (“A clear test for section 2 vote denial claims . . . has yet to emerge.”) 
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In 1986, a section 2 case reached the Supreme Court,130 and 
while the case dealt with vote dilution, its principles have been viewed 
as the benchmark for proving any section 2 effects claim. The Supreme 
Court held that a plaintiff pursuing a section 2 disparate impact theory 
must not only show that there was a disparate impact as a result of the 
challenged practice, but that the impact resulted from that practice 
“interact[ing] with social and historical conditions to cause an 
inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by [minority] and white voters 
to elect their preferred representatives.”131 To determine whether the 
impact is a product of this interaction, the Court adopted a set of 
factors, now known as the “Gingles factors,” which were originally 
enumerated by Congress in a Senate Committee report accompanying 
the bill amending section 2.132 The factors are not exclusive, and not all 
of them will be relevant in every case.133 In Veasey, the Fifth Circuit 
chose to adopt a newly minted two-part framework already adopted 
by the Fourth and Sixth Circuits and inspired by both the language of 
section 2 itself134 and the Supreme Court’s guidance in Gingles.135 The 
two elements of this framework are: 
1. “The challenged standard, practice, or 
procedure must impose a discriminatory burden on 
members of a protected class, meaning that members 
of the protected class have less opportunity than other 
members of the electorate to participate in the political 
process and to elect representatives of their choice; 
[and] 
2. That burden must in part be caused by or 
linked to social and historical conditions that have or 
currently produce discrimination against members of 
the protected class.”136 
 
130 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
131 Id. at 47. 
132 Id. at 36–37. 
133 Veasey, 830 F.3d at 246. 
134 See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). 
135 Veasey, 830 F.3d at 245. 
136 Id. at 245–46. 
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Additionally, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the Fourth and 
Sixth Circuits in deciding that the Gingles factors, and an overall 
totality of the circumstances approach, should be used for the second 
step, stating that they are effective in evaluating the causal link 
between the disparate effects of the current law and the effects of past 
and current discrimination.137 In applying this framework and 
conducting the fact-intensive analysis required, the Fifth Circuit held 
that the Texas voter ID law violated section 2 and had a discriminatory 
effect on the voting rights of minorities in the state.138 It remanded the 
remedy consideration to the district court, instructing the lower court 
to create a remedy that ameliorated the violation while also respecting 
the intent of the state legislature to combat voter fraud.139 
II. HISTORY OF NATIVE AMERICAN DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
Before moving to the analysis of North Dakota’s voter ID law, 
it is important to highlight the historical underpinning of its 
detrimental effect: the disenfranchisement of Native Americans. While 
Native Americans have been the group on this continent the longest, 
they have hardly been given the respect they deserve. Thanks largely 
to the now-vilified actions of settlers, soldiers, and politicians who 
continually drove them further west,140 spread disease,141 and fought 
wars with them over land,142 Native Americans are not as numerous 
as they once were. However, Native Americans still make up a sizeable 
portion of the population in many states,143 and the national 
 
137 Id. at 246. 
138 Id. at 265. 
139 Id. at 272. 
140 See Elizabeth Prine Pauls, Trail of Tears, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Jan. 
16, 2008), https://www.britannica.com/event/Trail-of-Tears. 
141 See Michael S. Rosenwald, Columbus Brought Measles to the New World. It 
Was a Disaster for Native Americans, WASH. POST (May 5, 2019, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2019/05/05/columbus-brought-
measles-new-world-it-was-disaster-native-americans/. 
142 See American-Indian Wars, HISTORY (Nov. 17, 2019), https://www.history.
com/topics/native-american-history/american-indian-wars. 
143 See Native Americans and the US Census: How the Count Has Changed, USA 
FACTS (Jan. 20, 2020, 11:12 AM), https://usafacts.org/articles/native-americans-
and-us-census-how-count-has-changed/. 
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population is projected to continue trending upwards.144 Thus, for 
fairness to both Native Americans as citizens of the United States and 
to the integrity of elections conducted in this country, it is imperative 
that states protect against discrimination, ensuring that Native 
Americans not only have the opportunity to have their voices heard 
but also making sure their voices count. 
A. Native American Disenfranchisement pre-VRA 
For the first 136 years of America’s existence under the 
Constitution, most Native Americans were denied the right to vote.145 
Initially, Native Americans never wanted to be a part of this country 
and had no desire to participate in the American political system; 
during the earliest history of the United States, the country was 
confined to the east of the Appalachian Mountains, and more than 
eighty percent of the present-day country was occupied by self-
governing Native Americans.146 However, three decisions made by 
Justice Marshall, in what later became known as the Marshall trilogy, 
set in motion the ultimate goal of robbing Tribal Nations of their 
autonomy. In Johnson v. M’Intosh, the first case, the Court held that 
private citizens were not permitted to purchase native lands,147 while 
the second and third cases, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. 
Georgia, established both the status of Native American tribes as non-
foreign nations, in the former (meaning Native American tribes lacked 
original jurisdiction to file suit in the Supreme Court), and the federal 
government’s exclusive relationship with the “sovereign” tribes in the 
latter (meaning that state laws were unenforceable against tribes).148 
 
144 See Indian Country Demographics, NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS (June 1, 
2020), https://www.ncai.org/about-tribes/demographics. 
145 Becky Little, Native Americans Weren’t Guaranteed the Right to Vote in Every 
State Until 1962, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/news/native-american-vot
ing-rights-citizenship (last visited Aug. 20, 2019). 
146 Judith Nies, Native American History: A Chronology of a Culture’s Vast 
Achievements and Their Links to World Events 361 (The Random House 
Publishing Group) (1996). 
147 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
148 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 
U.S. 1 (1831). 
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The one survivor of true Native American autonomy after the 
Marshall trilogy was continuing the traditional British practice of 
purchasing desired Native land through treaties allowing tribes to 
exercise self-governance over the land they still occupied.149 However, 
as the “manifest destiny” concept permeated the political zeitgeist of 
the time and the industrial revolution continued, Native Americans 
were seen as an impediment to the economic development of the 
burgeoning country.150 Thus, over time, the treaties based on the 
principles established by the Marshall trilogy were ignored or willfully 
violated, and Native Americans were driven further and further west, 
both through governmental removal policies that forced them from 
their home states and through bloody wars fought by the United States 
against numerous tribes for their land and its resources.151 And in 1871, 
with the passage of the Appropriations Act, the federal government 
ended the treaty relationship altogether, instead establishing 
dominant power over Native American tribes through statutes or 
executive orders.152 By 1900, Native Americans had lost 95 percent of 
the land they once held in 1800, and nearly all Native American tribes 
were sequestered onto reservations.153 And in 1903, the Supreme Court 
held that Congress could unilaterally disregard treaties made with 
Native American tribes prior to 1871 through its “plenary power” over 
Native lands.154 
Now that Native Americans were deprived of their autonomy 
and forced to develop a relationship with the United States federal 
government, the question of citizenship eventually arose. The 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, passed shortly after the 
conclusion of the Civil War, purported to guarantee to all citizens, 
regardless of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, due 
process and equal protection under the laws, and the right to vote,155 
though, of course, those guarantees were not actually realized until 
 
149 Nies, supra note 146, at 361. 
150 Id. at 362–63. 
151 Id. 
152 Indian Appropriations Act, ch. 120 § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (1871) (current version at 
25 U.S.C. § 71). 
153 Nies, supra note 146, at 364–65. 
154 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
155 U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XV. 
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much later. Nevertheless, the citizenship question, and the question of 
whether Native Americans had the right to vote, were debated after 
those Amendments were enacted. 
The contemporaneous answers to those questions can be 
found in Elk v. Wilkins,156 decided in 1884 by the Supreme Court. In 
interpreting the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,157 
The Court first held that members of Native American tribes, even 
though they were born within the geographic confines of the United 
States, were not actually born in the country of the United States and 
thus were not subject to its jurisdiction, as their allegiance was to their 
tribe.158 Accordingly, those born within a tribe could not claim 
birthright citizenship, likening this situation to that of a foreign 
ambassador whose child is born within the United States.159 It further 
held that, to become a naturalized citizen, a tribe member would have 
to renounce his old allegiance to his tribe and become part of through 
a formal means of naturalization, either by statute or under a treaty 
adopted for the purpose of naturalization.160 In deciding the case on its 
facts, the Court held that the plaintiff, a Nebraska man who was born 
in a tribal nation but later abandoned his tribe to “adopt the habits and 
manners of civilized people,”161 was not a citizen and therefore could 
not vote in a Nebraska election because he had not been formally 
naturalized by the United States government, even though he met all 
other requirements to vote in Nebraska elections.162 
The first large wave of Native American citizenship via 
naturalization came by way of the Dawes Act.163 Enacted in 1887, the 
Act’s result was the fractionation Native American tribal reservation 
lands into smaller parcels, granted by the Government to individual 
 
156 Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884). 
157 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and 
of the state wherein they reside.”) (emphasis added). 
158 Elk, 112 U.S. at 102. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 101, 103. 
161 Id. at 109. 
162 Id. 
163 Dawes Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (repealed 1934). 
2021 COMBATING VOTER FRAUD OR DISENFRANCHISING  309 
Native Americans in what was known as “allotment.”164 Native 
Americans held the allotments as individual property owners while 
the leftover surplus land was sold to white settlers or corporations who 
were hungry for western expansion.165 While the Dawes Act gave 
hundreds of thousands of Native Americans United States 
citizenship,166 its enforcement was often coerced, as pressure was 
applied by the government through monetary payment and 
deception.167 The Act also caused wide-ranging damage to Native 
American tribal culture and tribal independence.168 Finally, much of 
the allotted land was poor in agricultural quality, and many Native 
Americans found it difficult to subsist off the land and were eventually 
forced to sell or lease their interests to survive.169 The eventual failure 
of the Dawes Act and “allotment” as a policy measure led to changes 
in the government’s policy towards Native Americans in the early 
twentieth century.170 
Citizenship for all Native Americans would not be granted 
until 1924, when Congress, shortly after World War I (where tens of 
thousands of Native Americans fought, citizens and non-citizens alike) 
and the expansion of the franchise to women,171 passed the Indian 
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Citizenship Act.172 While all Native Americans born in or naturalized 
by the United States should have now had the full array of benefits 
that go along with citizenship, including the right to vote, that was not 
the case. No matter what action was taken on the federal level at this 
point in history to protect civil rights for discriminated groups, states 
were still in nearly full control of which people voted in their 
elections.173 And much like the tactics used by southern states to 
disenfranchise African Americans during this time period, states with 
a large Native American population began to do the same shortly after 
all Native Americans became citizens. These states had success with 
similar disenfranchisement techniques used in the South, such as 
literacy tests, poll taxes, English language tests, and polling place 
restrictions.174 These states also developed disenfranchisement 
methods that were unique to Native American citizens, denying the 
right to vote on the basis of a failure to sever tribal relations,175 a lack 
of state taxing power,176 the classification of Native Americans as 
“wards of the federal government” and disenfranchising them on the 
same basis as the mentally insane,177 and failure to meet residency 
requirements due to living on reservation land.178 
B. Native American Disenfranchisement post-VRA 
Though these laws worked to deny the full nature of their 
citizenship, Native Americans fought back with a vengeance, and in a 
state-by-state approach, such laws were slowly struck down by federal 
and state courts. By 1960, all of these discriminatory laws had been 
struck down by courts or repealed by state legislatures, the last of 
which being the Utah legislature abandoning its statute previously 
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upheld residency statute in 1957.179 And the expansive VRA, enacted 
in 1965, became a crucial buffer to guarantee that facially and forcibly 
denying Native Americans (and all other vulnerable groups) the right 
to actually cast a vote would never again be upheld in a court of law. 
The VRA protected against the prevention of the franchise from Native 
Americans in many ways. To start, the amended section 2 has greatly 
helped all plaintiffs to establish dilution violations of the VRA, and it 
has specifically helped Native Americans challenge many schemes 
that would have been unassailable previously.180 Additionally, in the 
1975 reauthorization, Congress adopted section 203, a provision which 
requires states to provide all election information available in English 
in another language if the jurisdiction in question meets the coverage 
requirements.181 Notably for Native Americans, many of whom speak 
languages that are historically unwritten, section 203 further provides 
that the state or subdivision is also required to have oral instruction 
and assistance for all registration and voting matters.182 Finally, and 
arguably the most significant, section 5 of the VRA is a “preclearance” 
provision, which requires state governments and political 
subdivisions with a history of discrimination (determined by a 
coverage formula)183 to obtain the approval of the federal government 
before introducing any laws that changed state electoral procedures.184 
This section has been maintained for every subsequent reauthorization 
 
179 See Windy Boy v. Big Horn County, 647 F. Supp. 1002, 1019, 1022 (D. Mont. 
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312 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 29 
of the VRA, with the last reauthorization in 2006 extending it through 
2032.185 
While the VRA has helped to prevent disenfranchisement 
historically, its impact has been dampened in recent years thanks to 
the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision Shelby County v. Holder.186 This case 
saw five members of the Court, led by Chief Justice Roberts, declare 
that the coverage formula used to determine which states and political 
subdivisions were subject to section 5 was unconstitutional as 
presently constructed, thus rendering the preclearance requirement 
unenforceable.187 Congress had made no changes to the coverage 
formula since 1975, even though they reauthorized the VRA again in 
1982 and 2006, and for Justice Roberts and the majority, the formula, 
based on data from over forty years ago, was not representative of the 
present day nature of the country, and heavily burdened the states 
subjected to it.188 The Court claimed that “the conditions that originally 
justified these measures no longer characterize voting in the covered 
jurisdictions.”189 However, to no surprise, this statement has proven to 
be a fiction.190 
This gutting of the VRA allowed many states and counties in 
the South to escape federal preclearance before passing new election 
laws, and it also did the same for states with a history of discrimination 
against Native Americans, which includes the states of Alaska and 
Arizona, and Oglala Lakota County and Todd County in South 
Dakota, both of which contain a Native American reservation.191 For 
example, in 2016, Arizona passed a law, known as HB 2023, which 
made it a felony offense for a person other than a family member or 
 
185 About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 11, 
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caregiver to collect and deliver a voter’s ballot, colloquially known as 
“ballot harvesting.”192 This change is one that clearly would have 
required preclearance in a world without Shelby County. As the Ninth 
Circuit noted in its decision overturning the law for violating section 2 
of the VRA, Native American voters (and other vulnerable groups of 
voters) are disproportionately affected by this law.193 In relaying the 
factual findings of the lower court, it noted that residents living on 
reservations were less likely to have accessible transportation, more 
likely to have issues with mail-in voting and access to outgoing mail 
services, and more likely to work multiple jobs and/or lack childcare 
services to prevent travel to the polls, all of which place a substantial 
adverse impact on voters in these communities and cause them to 
resort more often to third-parties to turn in their ballots.194 
Unfortunately, and somewhat unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court 
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision in July 2021.195 
The history of the fight for Native American enfranchisement 
has gone on for hundreds of years, has arisen in various forms, and 
has spawned numerous pieces of legislation to correct past wrongs. 
While so much has changed over this time, one constant has remained: 
the discriminatory disenfranchisement still exists. Even after the 
granting of citizenship, the outlawing of Jim Crow-esque laws, and the 
enactment and enforcement of the VRA, states and political 
subdivisions continue to find new ways to disenfranchise Native 
Americans. Shelby County has also made it much easier for previously 
covered jurisdictions to pass discriminatory voting laws. Therefore, 
ensuring that Native Americans receive a meaningful right to vote in 
every election in which they desire to exercise one of their most 
fundamental rights as citizens of the United States is of the utmost 
importance. An achievable step in that goal is fighting against 
restrictive voter ID laws that work in effect to weaken the access of 
Native Americans to the franchise. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF NORTH DAKOTA AND WASHINGTON VOTER ID 
LAWS 
In melding these two unfortunate realities together, it is clear 
that voter ID laws have the potential to be yet another way for states 
to disenfranchise their indigenous populations. Voter ID laws 
especially affect Native Americans living on reservations. Depending 
on the state, such laws may require residential addresses, which 
Native Americans living on reservations often lack, or may not accept 
tribal IDs (ID cards issued by a Tribal Government or a Federal agency 
working with such governments) as valid forms of identification, and 
Native Americans living on reservations may be less likely to have a 
valid state ID to use at the polls for a number of reasons, including 
impediments to travelling long distances, economic hardships, and 
lesser or no access to the internet.196 Additionally, even if a Native 
American has obtained a voter ID that does not require a residential 
address and allows, for example, a P.O. Box address, it may not match 
the address in the county database system, often because such non-
traditional addresses may create confusion, resulting in counties 
reassigning a new address in the county system and placing the voter 
in a new precinct without ever informing the voter of the change.197 
As seen in the opening paragraph, this scenario played out in 
parts of North Dakota prior to the 2018 election.198 While it is 
disturbing that such events happen, the far more disturbing concern is 
the laws that allow them to happen in the first place. North Dakota’s 
voter ID law created this problem and many others, problems that 
Washington’s voter ID law, amended in response to the events that 
have occurred in North Dakota, has attempted to eliminate. More 
states should follow Washington’s lead in working closely with their 
Native American populations and attempting to ensure that they have 
meaningful access to the franchise. 
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A. North Dakota’s Voter ID Law: A Troublesome Tale 
Before discussing the specifics of North Dakota’s voter ID law, 
it is important to accentuate the context surrounding the state’s history 
through different iterations of its voter ID law, and the events leading 
up to the push toward its current form. During the 2012 elections, 
Heidi Heitkamp, a Democratic candidate and a former state attorney, 
surprisingly won a Senate seat in North Dakota, a traditional 
Republican stronghold.199 The margin between Heitkamp and her 
competitor was razor thin, with Heitkamp only winning by 3,000 
votes.200 An increase in turnout by Native American voters helped 
contribute to Heitkamp’s upset victory.201 Months later, however, the 
State Legislative Assembly, controlled by Republicans, would take 
action.202 
The prior version of the voter ID law, passed in 2004, still 
required voters to have a residential address on their identification 
cards, but there were “fail-safe” mechanisms in place which allowed 
voters to cast their votes even if they failed to meet the ID 
requirements.203 In 2013, these mechanisms were completely 
eliminated when the Legislative Assembly amended the voter ID 
law.204 Under HAVA, states are usually not entitled to completely 
remove completely the option of offering provisional ballots or a 
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similar equivalent.205 However, because North Dakota is the only state 
that does not require voter registration, and has not required it since 
1951,206 it is exempt from the provisional ballot requirement and only 
uses them if a court order has dictated that poll hours be extended.207 
As a result, if a North Dakota voter showed up to the polls without 
proper identification, she would be turned away and sent home, 
unable to vote in any capacity.208 The amendment also reduced the 
acceptable forms of ID to the narrowest of degrees, accepting only 
state-issued or tribal government-issued ID cards, all of which must 
provide the voter’s residential address.209 As previously mentioned, 
this restriction has a much greater effect on Native Americans than on 
other groups; voters living on reservations often lack residential 
addresses and use PO boxes, which now failed to satisfy the new voter 
ID law.210 The law was amended further in 2015, imposing further 
restrictions which solidified the changes made two years prior.211 The 
move to eliminate “fail-safe” provisions was unprecedented, as the 
NCSL confirmed that no other state had enacted such a restrictive 
voter ID law.212 While the state legislature insisted that these changes 
were necessary to curb “voter fraud” in the state,213 it is hard to see 
these changes as anything other than targeted disenfranchisement by 
a politically-motivated (and potentially racially-motivated) 
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legislature, especially since there had only been one document case of 
“voter fraud” in the history of North Dakota prior to their actions.214 
Native American voters seemed to think so as well. Seven 
Native Americans, all members of the Turtle Mountain Band of 
Chippewa Indians Tribe, subsequently filed a lawsuit in United States 
District Court for the District of North Dakota against Secretary of 
State Al Jaeger, in his official capacity, in 2016, challenging the voter 
ID law’s state and federal constitutionality as well as its failure to 
comply with the VRA, though the Court never ruled on this claim.215 
Richard Brakebill and Elvis Norquay, two of the seven plaintiffs and 
both veterans, were denied the right to vote in 2014 solely because they 
failed to have a suitable residential address on their IDs.216 Lucille 
Vivier and Dorothy Herman, two more plaintiffs, were also denied the 
right to vote in 2014 for not having a proper residential address on 
their tribal IDs.217 Brakebill and Herman in particular knew they 
needed a new form of identification, but were unable to obtain a copy 
of their birth certificates, and thus were barred from even receiving a 
new state ID before the election.218 The plaintiffs were represented by 
the Native American Rights Fund (“NARF”), an organization which 
has provided legal assistance to tribes since 1970.219 For the upcoming 
2016 General Election, the plaintiffs requested that a preliminary 
injunction be entered against the amended law and that the prior law, 
with its “fail-safe” provisions, be reinstated.220 They argued that the 
needless, substantial, and disproportionate burdens placed on Native 
Americans by the amended voter ID law would lead to thousands of 
Native Americans being disenfranchised.221 
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The burden of establishing the need for the preliminary 
injunction is on the plaintiffs, and in following binding Eighth Circuit 
case law, Judge Daniel Hovland determined whether that burden was 
met by weighing the Dataphase factors, which include “(1) the threat of 
irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of balance between this 
harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on the other 
parties litigant; (3) the probability that the movant will succeed on the 
merits; and (4) the public interest.”222 No single factor can be 
dispositive, and all factors will be weighed to determine, on balance, 
whether the injunction should be granted.223 To begin this analysis, the 
Court first analyzed factor three, the “most significant factor” in the 
analysis.224 In doing so, the Court applied the balancing standard laid 
out by Justice Stevens in Crawford for evaluating the voter ID law’s 
constitutionality.225 
First looking to the burdens if the ID requirements were not 
enjoined, the Court held that the thorough record developed by the 
plaintiffs, be given considerable weight.226 The Court specifically 
noted statistical data from a survey of North Dakota voters and expert 
witness testimony, both of which examined the disparate living 
conditions for Native Americans as compared to non-Native 
Americans, including lower average household incomes, higher 
unemployment, a higher percentage of eligible voters not possessing a 
qualifying voter ID and being unable to update them, substantial 
travel and time burdens, and, of course, the residential address 
requirement and lack of “fail-safe” provisions.227 All of these statistical 
truths showed that a disproportionate burden was placed on Native 
Americans, who would have a much harder time obtaining a 
qualifying ID as compared to other groups. 
Furthermore, the defendant did not refute any of these 
findings, instead relying on Crawford and arguing both that the 
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changes are necessary to combat voter fraud and that the burden of 
making a trip and gathering appropriate documents to obtain a new 
ID is not a substantial burden on the right to vote.228 However, in 
Crawford, the Indiana law at least still allowed voters to cast 
provisional ballots, and the outcome of that case has largely been 
attributed to a poorly developed record.229 Here, conversely, the Court 
notes that the record is replete with information of the excessively 
burdensome requirements on Native American voters, and there are 
no “fail-safe” provisions.230 And because there was virtually no record 
of past or potential voter fraud in North Dakota, nor any other 
compelling interest which supported the removal of the provisions, 
the Court held that the burdens on Native American voters clearly 
outweighed the State’s interests, and subsequently that the voter ID 
law would violate the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
Clause.231 The rest of the Dataphase factors were also met, as the 
irreparable harm of being disenfranchised was clear and not 
compensable through damages, the right to vote for voting-age Native 
Americans outweighs any of North Dakota’s purported interests, and 
North Dakota produced no evidence suggesting that public confidence 
in elections would be undermined by allowing votes under “fail-safe” 
provisions.232 Accordingly, the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction was granted,233 and, at least for the 2016 election, thousands 
of Native Americans would not be disenfranchised by North Dakota’s 
voter ID law, as “fail-safe” options would be available for those 
without proper identification. 
But the story unfortunately does not end there. While the 2016 
election went off without a hitch, the Legislative Assembly once again 
amended the voter ID law in 2017.234 While state legislators claimed 
this change to the law addressed the problems raised in Brakebill, the 
law was essentially unchanged from the 2013 and 2015 iterations, 
except for the allowance of voters without a qualifying ID to cast a 
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provisional ballot and have that ballot counted if they showed up 
within six days with the proper identification.235 The Brakebill plaintiffs 
were rightfully angry, as this bill had done nothing to actually address 
the issues raised by Judge Hovland and arguably ignored them to 
continue suppressing otherwise qualified voters from exercising that 
right. Thus, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to facially 
challenge this newly amended version of the voter ID law.236 This time, 
the District Court granted a limited preliminary injunction to bar the 
state from implementing certain provisions.237 The Court held that this 
new iteration still required voters to have the same forms of qualifying 
ID’s that was earlier found to have a “discriminatory and burdensome 
impact on Native Americans,” and with updated statistical data, the 
plaintiffs showed that these burdens had not disappeared.238 
Additionally, the State had still failed to present evidence of actual 
voter fraud; therefore, the Court reiterated that “protecting the most 
cherished right to vote for thousands of Native Americans who 
currently lack a qualifying ID and cannot obtain one, outweighs the 
purported interest and arguments of the State.”239 In granting the 
partial injunction, the Court ordered the State to not enforce the 
residential address requirement and accept all mailing addresses 
(including P.O. boxes), expand the acceptable list of qualifying IDs and 
supplemental documentation issued by tribal governments, and 
clarify the procedure to have a provisional ballot counted.240 
While the preliminary injunction was in force during the 2018 
primaries, it would not survive in its full form to the midterm 
elections. The State requested to stay the portion of the injunction 
requiring its acceptance of any mailing address, and a divided panel 
of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the request on 
September 24, 2018, approximately six weeks before election day and 
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after early voting had already began.241 To determine whether to issue 
the stay, the Court applied a four-factor test that is nearly identical to 
the Dataphase factors.242 The appellate court presented a different 
calculation of the merits analysis, applying Crawford’s proposition that 
a showing of excessively burdensome requirements on some voters 
“does not justify broad relief that invalidates the requirements on a 
statewide basis as applied to all voters.”243 Additionally, even though 
the State failed to prevent any evidence of voter fraud, the Court still 
held that the State would suffer irreparable harm if the residence 
requirement was expanded, as the potential for scores of voters to vote 
in the wrong precinct could lead to a dilutive effect that could affect 
the outcomes of different elections.244 
The Eighth Circuit’s focus was narrow, discussing only 
residential addresses and omitting most of the statistics presented at 
the lower court level which established the disproportionate burdens 
placed on Native American voters in even obtaining a qualifying ID in 
the first place. Additionally, the only “irreparable” harm the Court 
sought to protect the State against was hypothetical voter fraud.245 The 
real burdens placed on thousands of Native Americans deserved a 
more thorough analysis from the Court, and its failure to conduct one 
allowed it to give undeserved weight to non-existent concerns.246 After 
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the issuance of this ruling, the plaintiffs filed an emergency appeal to 
the Supreme Court to vacate the stay;247 however, their application 
was denied 6-2, with Justices Kagan and Ginsburg dissenting from the 
denial.248 The finalization of this decision came so close to election day, 
and the risk of thousands of disenfranchised Native American voters 
being unable to participate in the 2018 election was a real concern. 
However, thanks to the united effort of NARF, four different Native 
American tribes located in North Dakota,249 and two community 
organizations to provide qualifying IDs free of charge,250 and despite 
an instance of aforementioned bureaucratic incompetence nearly 
getting in the way,251 Native American voter turnout hit record 
highs.252 
The Eighth Circuit eventually heard the appeal to the 
preliminary injunction in 2019, where it officially overturned the 
second preliminary injunction and held again that the plaintiffs were 
not likely to succeed on the merits of their facial challenge to both the 
residential address requirement and the requirement to present one of 
the statutorily enumerated IDs.253 It seemed like the battle was far from 
over, and that the risk of Native American disenfranchisement would 
once again rear its ugly head at the 2020 general election. However, 
with a denial of the State’s motion to dismiss and an upcoming trial 
date,254 North Dakota reached out to the parties to settle, and a binding 
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consent decree was entered thereafter.255 And as a result, safeguards 
were put into place to protect the right to vote of Native Americans in 
the state. One of the provisions of the decree requires the state to accept 
as valid, for the purposes of voting, the designation of a voter’s 
residential street address made by the Tribal Government, if the 
address is within the Tribal Government’s jurisdiction.256 Some others 
involve making sure that voters living on reservations have easy access 
to free qualifying IDs.257 Finally, the decree allows voters using a tribal 
ID to mark their residence on a map instead of using a numbered street 
address for purposes of the residency requirement, whereby the 
county 911 coordinator will then be required to assign a residential 
street address to that location; thus, all the voter must do is show up 
to vote with their residence marked on a map, and the onus is then on 
the state to verify the official address of that location and ensure the 
vote is counted.258 This unilateral process, deviating from the 
provisional ballot procedure enacted in 2017, eliminates the need to 
return to the polling place to verify a ballot that is set-aside, which is 
very important for voters who live on reservations, as many of them 
live far from polling sites or lack access to a regular form 
transportation, which made these return trips challenging.259 Thus, 
after seven long years, Native American voters in North Dakota will 
finally be ensured equitable participation in the electoral process. 
B. Washington’s Voter ID Law: A Quicker, Easier and 
More Just Potential Solution 
The journey to ensuring equitable voting rights for Native 
Americans in North Dakota was arduous, costly, and resulted in actual 
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disenfranchisement of some voters in two separate elections.260 
Conversely, Washington’s solution to the potential problem was 
quick, efficient, and relatively inexpensive. As part of its mission to 
improve voting access, the state legislature enacted a Native American 
Voting Rights Act, which took effect in July of 2019.261 The Bill 
addressed many concerns in protecting the right to vote for Native 
American citizens, and it was passed in response to the backlash 
surrounding the 2018 North Dakota voter ID law.262 The Bill’s 
protections include permitting Native Americans living on 
reservations to submit a “non-traditional” address, such as a PO box, 
on their voter registration applications, allowing a federally 
recognized tribe to use a tribal government building as the 
residential/mailing address for people living on the reservation, 
permitting the use of tribal identification cards for submission of an 
electronic registration application and not requiring a residential 
address to be on a tribal identification card when presenting 
identification at a voting center, allowing a federally recognized tribe 
to designate a state facility located on the reservation to serve as a 
voting registration center, and allowing a federally recognized tribe to 
request and receive a ballot drop box and establish a pick up location 
on the reservation.263 All of these protections make it easier for Native 
Americans to both register to vote and to actually vote in elections, and 
the allowance of non-residential addresses to count for Native 
American voters greatly increases their ability to participate in 
elections. Additionally, the placing of drop boxes on reservation land 
attacks the noted travel burden.264 
It is worth noting that the election landscape in Washington is 
markedly different than in North Dakota. As just mentioned, 
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Washington, like every state except for North Dakota, requires its 
voters to register before voting.265 Additionally, most voting in 
Washington takes place by mail,266 so the expansion of in-person voter 
ID requirements specifically may not have much of an actual effect. 
Thus, the specific changes made by Washington may not work for 
every state, and it still remains to be seen how the changes themselves 
will affect Native American turnout. However, it is clear that actions 
by state legislatures are the quickest and most efficient way to attempt 
to address the problem of discriminatory disenfranchisement, and on 
the whole, they should be more interested in protecting the 
fundamental rights of their citizens than in furthering their own 
partisan interests. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Native American disenfranchisement, a practice that began in 
the nineteenth century, is still an ongoing problem today. Yet Native 
American voters are not alone in this reality. States and political 
subdivisions continue to devise new ways to restrict the right to vote. 
Voter ID laws have become yet another example of one such method 
that can be used to disenfranchise not just Native Americans, but other 
groups as well. Since the turn of this century, we have seen the number 
of voter ID laws jump from fourteen to thirty-five, nine of which are 
characterized as strict. For nearly all of these laws, the term “voter 
fraud” is used as a defense and justification to severe restrictions on 
the fundamental right to vote. The prevalence of this term, including 
in areas that are not even correctly classified as “voter fraud,” would 
make an ill-informed person believe that our election system is 
rampant with liars and cheaters who are committing voter fraud to 
“rig” elections. But in reality, actual voter fraud is rarer than a Florida 
panther. This country has a long and ugly history of justifying 
suppressive voting restrictions with combating “voter fraud”: poll 
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taxes and white primaries are two such examples.267 However, that 
ugly chapter has not closed yet, and now the causal chain, beginning 
with the Thernstrom dissent and HAVA and leading through present 
day, has led some states to use voter ID laws to become part of another 
chapter in that story.268 
While courts may be able to provide relief against these laws, 
such lawsuits are exorbitant in cost, often span multiple years, and 
require mountains of evidence to prove a claim. The Supreme Court 
has done no favors on the constitutional front. By applying the 
Anderson-Burdick standard instead of strict scrutiny in Crawford, it has 
opened the door for far too much judicial deference, leading to results 
like Brakebill III, where the Eighth Circuit was able to overturn the 
injunction against North Dakota’s voter ID law simply by placing 
more emphasis on preventing “voter fraud” and less emphasis on how 
the law burdened Native Americans, achieved by omitting numerous 
statistical data relied on by the lower court. It was crystal clear from 
that data that this law was anything but a “minor burden” placed on 
Native American voters. Perhaps an “as-applied” challenge would 
have fared better, but regardless, the balancing standard, as shown in 
this case is far too amenable and can be abused. 
Voter ID laws challenged under Section 2 of the VRA are not 
much easier and may even be more expensive.269 Discriminatory 
purpose claims can often be “slam-dunk” cases if the intent can be 
shown.270 But proving intent can often be a difficult task, as it requires 
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a very thorough analysis which raises the costs of the litigation,271 and 
the hard evidence of legislative intent may not even exist. Effects 
claims brought under Section 2 may not be any easier, as pursuing a 
disparate impact theory in vote denial cases is still in its infancy.272 
Thus, challenging a voter ID law in this way would be both costly and 
risky. So, what then is the most effective avenue to overturn these 
discriminatory laws? 
The answer is state legislatures. These representatives need to 
begin working closely with their electorates to ensure that the right to 
vote, one of the most fundamental rights of United States citizens, is 
not “denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude.”273 In North Dakota’s case, the changes made 
in its voter ID law went against this principle and could have 
disenfranchised thousands of Native Americans in three separate 
elections, though the actions of a wise judge and the united effort of 
Native American Rights advocates and Tribal Nations nearly 
eliminated that reality in the 2016 and 2018 elections, respectively. In a 
country that portrays itself as a beacon of democracy, fundamental 
civil rights like the right to vote should never be discriminatorily 
sacrificed for political power plays. An example of a state legislature 
who understands its responsibility in upholding these democratic 
values is Washington’s, which went out of its way to listen to and 
address the real concerns of its Native American citizens. The rest of 
the states should soon follow in Washington’s path and amend or 
remove restrictive voter ID laws and other voting laws that do nothing 
to combat the mythical “voter fraud” and only serve to disenfranchise 
otherwise eligible voters. Native Americans, Black Americans, and all 
other vulnerable groups deserve more from a country that has 
constantly taken from them. They deserve a meaningful, valuable, and 
equitable right to vote. 
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